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Commentary

Market Tremors

This edition shouts out Public.com, a multi-asset investing platform built for those who take investing seriously. Public recently launched Alpha, an AI investment exploration tool, in the app store. We’re excited to host co-founder and co-CEO Jannick Malling on the next podcast to discuss the market and how AI levels the playing field. Stay tuned!

When market expectations drift too far from underlying fundamentals, they eventually become unsustainable. This sometimes leads to corrections that can trigger cascading effects across the broader market.

It is prevailing investment practices that partly fuel such a dynamic. While concepts like diversification and efficient markets appear sound, they often fail to account for the pressures investors face in practice. For instance, sophisticated retail investors have no mandate and typically have the space to make deliberate, calculated decisions. On the other hand, institutional-type investors, driven by the need to deliver consistent short-term profits, may feel compelled to chase returns. This pressure can lead to riskier behaviors, such as betting on low volatility by selling options. While this may produce steady returns in calm markets, it exposes investors to sudden shocks, volatility repricings, and forced unwinds when markets turn unexpectedly. Investors are often unprepared for such volatility, seldom owning options outright due to the rarity of shocks. This creates a market landscape skewed toward a “winner-takes-all” outcome, where only a few are positioned to benefit from such rare moments.

The following sections explore this realm of increasingly frequent, dramatic, and unpredictable outcomes. Let’s dive in.


In our excruciatingly detailed ‘Reality is Path-Dependent’ newsletter, we explored how markets are shaped by reflexivity (feedback loops) and path dependency (how past events influence the present), setting the stage for August 2024’s turbulence and recovery.

To recap, we noticed that while individual stocks experienced big price swings, the broader indexes, like the S&P 500—representing those stocks—showed restraint. Remarkably, the S&P 500 went over 350 sessions without a single 2% or more significant move lower, reflecting this calm. This happened because of a mix of factors, including many investors focusing on broader market calm, often expressed by selling options and, in some cases, using their profits to double down on directional bets in high-flying stocks. This helped create a gap between the calmer movements in the indexes and wilder swings in individual stock components, leading to falling correlations; beneath the surface, big tech, AI, and Mag-7 stocks gained ground, while smaller stocks in the index struggled, as shown by fewer stocks driving the market higher (weaker breadth).

Graphic: Retrieved from Bloomberg.

By arbitrage constraints, declining correlation is the reconciliation. When investors sell options on an index, the firms on the other side of the trade—like dealers or market makers—dynamically hedge their risk. They may do this by buying the index as its price drops and selling it when it rises, which can help keep the index within a narrower range and reduce actual realized volatility. However, this doesn’t apply as much to individual stocks, where we observed more options buying. For these stocks, hedging works differently: dealers may buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall, reinforcing trends and extending price moves. This creates a situation where the index stays relatively calm, but its components can swing more wildly.

Anyway, we noticed that as the connection between the index and its stocks was weakening, traders who bet on these differences (called dispersion) profited. As more participated in this and other volatility-suppressing trades, it became more successful. This shows how feedback loops (reflexivity) and past events (path dependency) influence future market behavior. Overall, this trade helped sustain the market rally and added stability as lesser-weighted stocks stepped up to offset the slowdown in leaders in July.

However, we speculated about the risks of a broader “sell-everything” market. Waning enthusiasm for big tech stocks and broader market selling on the news could manifest demand for protection (such as buying longer-dated put options). During the quieter, less liquid summer months, this could trigger increased volatility and lead to a sharp sell-off (as dealers or market makers hedge in the same direction the market’s moving, amplifying moves). Although low and stable volatility gave an optimistic market outlook, we considered advanced structures to hedge against potential pullbacks at low cost, including ultra-wide, broken-wing NDX put butterflies, ratio spreads, and low-cost VIX calls and call spreads (which, by way of the VIX being an indirect measure of volatility or volatility squared, offer amplified protection in a crash). In the event of market weakness, these structures would be closed/monetized, with the proceeds/profits used to lower the cost of upside participating trades through year-end. Again, further details can be found in the ‘Reality is Path-Dependent’ newsletter.

Graphic: Retrieved from UBS. Hedge funds were cutting risk in July 2024.

Our warnings about the risks of extreme momentum crowding and positioning leading to violent unwinds were borne out in August 2024. Markets reeled as recession probabilities were repriced, quarterly earnings disappointed, and central bank policies diverged. The Federal Reserve’s dovish stance starkly contrasted with an unanticipated rate hike by the Bank of Japan. This fueled considerable volatility across assets, particularly higher-beta equities and cryptocurrencies, which are more heavily influenced by traditional risk and monetary policy factors. The episode highlighted the vulnerabilities of a market reliant on leveraged trading and concentrated investments; the situation was about more than just a fundamental shock.

Graphic: Retrieved from Bianco Research.

The unraveling was marked by spikes in stock market volatility measures like the VIX, a liquidity vacuum, and forced deleveraging by trend-following and volatility-sensitive strategies. Despite this clearing some froth, key equity and volatility positioning and valuation vulnerabilities remained, leaving markets fragile and uncertain whether growth will stabilize or deteriorate.

Graphic: Retrieved from Bloomberg via PPGMacro. Yen versus Nasdaq.

Some accounts compared the selling to the 1987 stock market crash. Volatility broke its calm streak, with spot-vol beta—the relationship between market movements and expected/implied volatility changes—rising and correlations increasing.

Graphic: Retrieved from Morgan Stanley via @NoelConvex.

Early warning signs of precariousness emerged as prices for far out-of-the-money SPX and VIX options—key indicators and drivers of potential crashes when heavily traded—soared hundreds of percent the week before crash day, Monday, August 5. These tail-risk hedges, often viewed as insurance against steep market drops, carried well, becoming significantly more expensive as demand surged. Just as insurers raise premiums on homes in disaster-prone areas to account for higher risk, the soaring cost of these options reflected the market’s growing fear of extreme outcomes. This repricing fed into broader quantitative measures, triggering a wave of deleveraging and prompting investors to offload hundreds of billions in stock bets, amplifying the sell-off.

Graphic: Retrieved from Nomura via @MenthorQpro.

At one point, the VIX breached 65, its highest level since 2020. A lack of liquidity during pre-market hours and the shift from short-term to longer-term hedges contributed to this sharp rise. The VIX is calculated based on a selection of S&P 500 options about 30 days out, chosen by an algorithm that looks at the middle point between the prices people are willing to buy and sell those options. When there’s not a lot of trading activity and markets get volatile, the difference between the buying (bid) and selling (ask) prices widens, lending to the VIX being higher than it should be.

Graphic: Retrieved from JPMorgan via @jaredhstocks.

Comparatively, VIX futures—perhaps a better measure of hedging demands outside regular market hours—lagged. JPMorgan claims the fast narrowing in the VIX spot and futures indicates the VIX spot overstated fear and hedging demand.

Graphic: Retrieved from Bloomberg.

Moreover, a technical issue at the Cboe options exchange delayed trading, and by the time the problem was resolved, the VIX had already dropped sharply. This coincided with traders doubling down on short-volatility positions and buying stocks, confident in the S&P 500’s historical tendency to rebound in the months following similar volatility spikes.

Graphic: Retrieved from Nomura via The Market Ear.

Rocky Fishman, founder of Asym 500, explains that the dislocations above were compounded by dispersion traders who likely experienced mark-to-market losses on their short index positions while single-stock markets remained closed. This forced some to cover their short index volatility positions, resulting in a pre-market surge in index volatility. Once trading resumed, many began selling single-stock options, triggering a broader decline in volatility levels—particularly in single-stock options.

Graphic: Retrieved from Bloomberg via Asym 500.

So, the rapid decrease in the VIX was driven more by positioning dynamics and the calculation mechanics of the VIX itself rather than a complete unwinding of risky trades. Additionally, the S&P 500’s movement into lower-volatility segments of the SPX options curve, which the VIX relies on, further intensified this decline. Kris Sidial of The Ambrus Group adds, “It’s quite evident that many have doubled down on [short volatility]. But you don’t need to trust our data. Barring any additional volatility shocks in the next few weeks, I expect some of these firms to deliver stellar numbers by the end of Q3 due to their inclination to take on more risk.”

Graphic: Retrieved from Bloomberg via @iv_technicals.

The market’s recovery in the fall was mainly driven by the Mag-7 giants, whose robust performance overshadowed the struggles of smaller stocks. The August decline created an opportunity to acquire beaten-down stocks at discounts, with investors indeed seeing the panic as a buy signal; outside of significant crises unable to topple the economy (like the bank failures in 2023), back-tests suggest that when the VIX exceeds 35, the S&P 500 has historically risen upwards of 15% over the next six months.

Graphic: Retrieved from Bloomberg.

The recovery was not without risks, with the divide between market leaders and laggards highlighting continued fragility. In any case, supportive flows into mega-caps and dealer hedging activities helped stabilize broader indexes through November.

Graphic: Retrieved from Nomura via SpotGamma.

The growing gap between the stable performance of the S&P 500 and the larger fluctuations in its components created profits for those dispersion traders we discussed. However, as valuations for mega-cap stocks climb, the market becomes more vulnerable to shifts in sentiment or capital flows. Events like the yen carry trade—where borrowing in Japan funded investments in U.S. Treasuries and equities—unwind exposed concentration risks and positioning imbalances, which could amplify future shocks.

Graphic: Retrieved from Bloomberg via @Alpha_Ex_LLC.

As for potential triggers and shocks going forward, rising inequality and populism are creating deep divisions within and among major powers, while protectionist policies strain potential global cooperation. According to Cem Karsan of Kai Volatility, these dynamics drive economic battles and indirect conflicts, with Eastern nations working to reduce Western influence. This shift coincides with a new era of high inflation, widening wealth gaps, and changing power dynamics. Millennials, now a dominant force in the workforce and politics, are challenging decades of policies that primarily benefited corporations and the wealthy, reversing globalization and redistributing wealth—though this comes at the cost of heightened inflation.

These structural changes disrupt traditional investment strategies like the 60/40 portfolio. A major geopolitical event, such as China moving on Taiwan, could severely impact supply chains, critical industries, and the global economy, with significant repercussions for stocks like Nvidia and broader indices like the S&P 500. If market bets against panic (like short volatility) unravel, it could trigger more swings like August’s. The same reflexivity that has stabilized markets since then could amplify volatility during future shocks, turning successive disruptions into severe crises if market positioning is misaligned.

Graphic: Retrieved from Joshua Lim.

Despite this challenging backdrop, short-term market behavior operates independently, dictated by supply and demand dynamics. Seasonal flows, particularly during year-end, created a bullish bias; reduced holiday trading volumes, combined with reinvestment effects and significant options expirations, contributed to structural upward pressure on markets. These flows and a historical tendency for election years to drive positive performance suggested a right-skewed distribution for near-term outcomes.

Graphic: Retrieved from SpotGamma.

The prospect and fulfillment of a “red sweep,” characterized by follow-on deregulation, a business-friendly environment, and more animal spirits, boosted markets. However, caution was spotted in certain areas, like bonds, where expectations for inflation rose.

Graphic: Retrieved from Oraclum Capital.

Ultimately, the market overextended, highlighting the risk of a peak as it caught down to weak breath on the Federal Reserve’s surprising hawkish shift in December. This change led to volatility in equities, interest rates, and currencies, reminiscent of the spike in August when the VIX jumped and surpassed the S&P 500’s decline. Such persistent divergences validate a clear shift into a new market regime characterized by volatility that consistently outpaces market sell-offs.

Image
Graphic: Retrieved from Nomura.

In a report, Cboe said that equity spot/vol beta surged to -3.3, meaning for every 1% drop in the S&P 500, the VIX gained 3.3 points—exceeding even August’s extreme levels. SPX options priced greater downside risk, with skew steepening. Notwithstanding, correlations settled near historic lows, signaling investor focus on sector rotation and stock dispersion.

Graphic: Retrieved from Bloomberg via Alpha Exchange.

Early warning signals appeared when volatility and equities increased simultaneously, highlighting a “spot up, vol up” pattern that frequently foreshadows market peaks. For instance, at one moment, upside calls on major stocks like Nvidia and the S&P 500 were well-priced and poised to perform strongly in a rally. This occurs because, during rallies, implied volatility of call options generally decreases as investors tend to sell calls tied to their stock holdings rather than liquidating them entirely. When investors chase synthetic upside exposure through call options, indices like the VIX could stabilize or increase as the market rises. Since counterparties typically adjust their exposure by buying the underlying asset, it propels the rally and magnifies market fluctuations.

Graphic: Retrieved from Nomura.

Beyond the chase, the post-election rally got an extra boost from unwinding protective puts. Significant events like elections typically boost demand for puts as hedges against adverse outcomes, with counterparties hedging these positions by selling underlying stocks or futures, among other things. As markets rise, time passes, or uncertainty fades, these puts lose value, leading counterparties to unwind hedges by buying stocks and futures. This is a structural support that pushes markets higher.

Graphic: Retrieved from Nomura.

Corporate buybacks and stabilizing volatility levels encouraged funds to increase their exposure. Nomura estimated that assuming stable markets, up to $145 billion in additional volatility-sensitive buying could occur over three months. Although 30-day implied volatility traded a bit above realized volatility, this signaled uncertainty rather than distress. Seasonal factors mentioned in the previous section—like low holiday liquidity and limited selling pressure—added to the upward trend.

Graphic: Retrieved from Goldman Sachs.

Then came the FOMC meeting, followed by December’s massive options expiration (OPEX), disrupting the supportive dynamics that had fueled the rally. While a rate cut was expected, uncertainty around forward guidance introduced volatility just as the market faced a substantial unwinding of stabilizing exposure. Those who hedged customer-owned call options by buying stock during rallies and hedged customer-owned puts by selling stock during declines were forced to re-hedge as markets turned lower following the FOMC meeting. This involved selling stocks and futures, adding downside pressure.

Macro factors triggered the initial downside, with positioning amplifying equity volatility.

Graphic: Retrieved from SpotGamma.

Ultimately, volatility levels signaled oversold conditions ahead of a massive put-clearing OPEX, setting the stage for a year-end lift. The volatility spikes in August and December remained contained, as they were largely event-driven and mitigated by existing hedges and a market structure anchored by year-end flows. The subsequent unwinding of significant options positions in December eased the pressure, while reinvestment and re-leveraging effects into January supported against weak breadth; as the earlier-mentioned Cem Karsan explains best, the substantial gains over the year increased collateral for leveraged investors, enabling them to reinvest profits or take on more leverage, which has given markets a lease on life through today.


2025 might see increased volatility, not driven by typical inflation or recession fears but by the positioning dynamics herein that can magnify market swings during downturns. The so-called “red sweep” introduces optimism and the likelihood of greater risk-taking, which could result in one-sided positioning and heightened volatility. Factors like populism, protectionism, and rising interest rates are additional pressures on stocks and bonds. Gold and Bitcoin are identified as potential stores of value, but Bitcoin remains prone to speculation, liquidity challenges, and regulatory obstacles.

The following newsletters will identify structures to lean into fundamental catalysts and underlying volatility contexts. Notably, the structures discussed earlier (such as ultra-wide, broken-wing NDX put butterflies, ratio spreads, and low-cost VIX calls and call spreads) may continue to perform as effective hedges.

See you soon for a detailed part two.

Graphic: Retrieved from Invesco via Bloomberg.

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Categories
Commentary

The Alchemy of Forecasting

This week’s letter is about 6,000 words and may be cut off. If so, try viewing it in a browser window!

Our recent focus reflexivity manifests in politics through reinforcing shared beliefs and narratives. When political group members share an ideology, their interactions often confirm and amplify their existing views, creating feedback loops. These loops can shape the group’s perception of political realities, such as the strength of their candidate, which in turn influences voter turnout and campaign contributions. This homogeneity also leads to a lack of exposure to opposing views, increasing the risk of misreading voter sentiment and making strategic errors in political campaigns.

This dynamic was evident in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Many in liberal circles were convinced of Hillary Clinton’s victory, relying on polling data and a widespread belief in her inevitability. This perception reinforced within these groups created a reflexive cycle that contributed to complacency and lower turnout in critical swing states. Those in the Republican bubble who supported Donald Trump also experienced their form of reflexivity; early support and momentum generated enthusiasm that ultimately led to his victory. Both sides exhibited fallibility—Democrats overestimated Clinton’s support, while Republicans underestimated the opposition to Trump.

Vuk Vukovic, the CIO and co-founder of Oraclum Capital, is acutely aware of reflexivity and fallibility’s impact on politics and economics. Over the past decade, he has applied his academic research in political economics to accurately predict the outcomes of the past two U.S. elections and the Brexit referendum, as well as influence policy in his home country of Croatia. Following the pandemic, Vuković and his co-founders sought to monetize their predictive success, leading them to the financial markets. Today, they use the wisdom of crowds and their understanding of social networks to outperform markets with their hedge fund. Vuković graciously joined Physik Invest’s Market Intelligence podcast to discuss his career, research, starting and operating a hedge fund, trading psychology, and investment processes. The video can be accessed at this link and below. An edited transcript follows.

We spoke in April, and Oraclum Capital, your upstart hedge fund, sat at ~$8.6 million in assets under management. Has this number changed?

We’re going into September with $17 million under management, so it has been going well.

I want to go back in time before you studied economics. What were some of your big interests growing up, and how did they guide your pursuit of economics in school?

My interest in economics partly stemmed from my parents, who were both involved in that field. But even as a kid, I was fascinated by currencies and stock markets. Something about them attracted me—maybe it was the whole money aspect, but I think it was more profound than that. However, as I pursued my education, I diverted from finance and instead focused on political economics, which is more theoretical and combines public choice theory with macroeconomics. You can’t fully understand economics without understanding politics. Fast forward to today, I’ve returned to my first love, finance.

The idea of making money got me engaged in markets, but the details and the process kept me engaged. So, structuring trades, learning how markets work, and things like credit and positioning kept me involved. Does this resonate?

That’s the primary motivation, and you learn things that make it more or less attractive. In our case, it was more attractive.

So you went to the London School of Economics and the University of Oxford. Why those two?

Before that, I earned my Bachelor of Economics at the University of Zagreb in Croatia. During the summers of 2009 and 2010, I went to the United States—first to attend a summer school at Berkeley and then Harvard the following year. 

I considered staying in Zagreb, but after those experiences, I realized I should go abroad. I chose the United Kingdom because it was closer and less expensive than the United States, especially at the master’s level. In Europe, you typically pursue a master’s before a PhD, allowing you to finance your education gradually.

The LSE is a prestigious institution with a political economy program aligned with my interests. If I wanted to go to the United States immediately, I would have had to choose an economics PhD and then branch out from there, which is not what I wanted.

Did you get a lot of value from those summer schools? 

Absolutely. They showed me that I could compete in an environment where I wasn’t sure I would be able to.

I earned straight A’s at Berkeley and Harvard. I took an Intermediate Macroeconomics course and a Contemporary Theories of Political Economy course at Berkeley. At Harvard, I studied International Monetary Economics, taught by a former assistant to Milton Friedman. I also took a course on global financial crises there, which was particularly interesting to me because the Global Financial Crisis had just started in 2008. At that time, I was in my second or third year of university, and it shaped my research focus ever since. I found my niche by exploring the financial crisis from a political economy perspective, examining the political causes of the crisis, such as why banks were allowed to take on so much risk, and so on.

You wrote a couple of papers. How did you develop your theses, and how long did it take you to research and defend them?

Most of my political economics research explicitly focuses on corruption and lobbying. When I came to Oxford, my attention was primarily on the collusion between politics and economics—essentially, the relationship between the corporate and political worlds. 

It all began with a paper on corruption in Croatia, where I examined the connection between firms and people in power and how this relationship affected reelection chances. I also attempted to measure corruption through public procurements awarded to specific firms. Unfortunately, my findings showed a significant impact of corruption on the reelection chances of Croatian mayors, cities, and municipalities.

The second paper I worked on centered around bank bailouts in the United States during the 2008 crisis, which has been a focal point of my research interests. I aimed to determine whether banks better connected to congresspeople received a more favorable bailout deal relative to their assets, and indeed, they did. With these two ideas and the supporting data, I developed a more unified theory on how corporate executives and politicians connect and how those connections impact economic outcomes. In my specific case, I was looking at income distribution and inequality.

This led to my third paper at Oxford. I analyzed a massive dataset of about a million corporate executives in the United States and the United Kingdom, linking them to politicians and observing that those better connected had much higher salaries. Specifically, the impact was about $150,000 more in annual salary in the United States. To clarify, these were corporate executives—CEOs, the C-suite, or board members—being compared within the same company, with the politically connected ones earning a premium of approximately $150,000. Political connections were measured by whether the executive had previously worked with someone at a senior government level or belonged to the same organization, such as a country club, charity, or other networking group. These affiliations might not necessarily make you friends, but they provide a way to connect with critical individuals when needed.

This academic work culminated in the book I published this year, Elite Networks: The Political Economy of Inequality. It is trending well at Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and other retailers.

I remember this a couple of years ago: Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and Jerome Powell appeared at the same party or dinner. Jerome Powell was grilled over what was potentially discussed, and your response reminded me of that.

I was looking into that precisely during the Global Financial Crisis when Timothy Franz Geithner and Henry M. Paulson, Jr. held regularly scheduled meetings with the CEOs of the top eight banks. This was documented in The New Yorker and The New York Times. I was reading those transcripts, and it was clear that these people were friends. There’s also an excellent paper on social connections in a crisis, highlighting the importance of being connected—especially when you need to reach the right person to secure a bailout for your bank in times of crisis.

Graphic: Retrieved from CNBC.

Did your findings in Croatia ever have an impact on policy?

Surprisingly, yes, though not as much as I had hoped.

My main finding was that there are very suspicious levels of public procurement where companies with, for example, zero employees can bid and secure huge deals from local governments. I focused solely on the local level. One potential solution to combat this issue is to introduce complete budget transparency so that the public can see every single expenditure made by the government. This would include everything from large procurement deals down to receipts for lunches, dinners, and similar expenses. You could even see who’s dining with whom and the salaries of public sector employees.

We started implementing this project in a few cities in Croatia, including Bjelovar—about five or six cities. These cities adopted the project with a message of having nothing to hide and being open and completely transparent. Incidentally, all the mayors who implemented our project significantly outperformed their opponents in subsequent elections. So, while corruption may help you get reelected, being fully transparent helps even more.

We wanted to extend this project to a broader audience of mayors, but unfortunately, the interest wasn’t there. What did happen, however, was that we were able to make this a formal part of the budget law. But now, the problem is that the bureaucracy watered it down. The law explicitly requires every local government to have full transparency, but as they say, the devil is in the details. Bureaucrats added a second layer of interpretation, defining what it means to be fully transparent, and the law’s impact has been diluted. So, I’m done fighting those battles. That’s behind me, and I’m doing something completely different now.

How did you develop the methodology used to predict elections, and how did you monetize it?

I didn’t initially think about starting a hedge fund, but I knew there was some applicability in markets.

So, my two colleagues, Dejan Vinković, a physicist, and Mile Šikić, a computer scientist, and I were in the academic sector. They were professors, and I was a lecturer at my university. We wanted to find a new way to create better, more predictive surveys. We were looking at what Nate Silver was doing in the United States, and since the three of us were all political junkies, elections were the first thing we wanted to apply these methods to. So, we started with the British elections in 2015, and it worked well. Our correct prediction of the Brexit referendum and Trump’s 2016 election further propelled us; we initially wanted to write a paper on our new prediction method, but we opted to try to build a company and monetize it instead.

Now, what’s the logic behind that? There are two components. 

The first is the wisdom of crowds. You ask people what they think will happen and what everyone around them thinks will happen. Let’s say it’s an election. So, who is going to win, Trump or Harris? That’s the first question. Second, what do you think other people around you think will happen? When you get to that second question, you put people in other people’s shoes, forcing them to switch between System 1 and 2 thinking, as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky describe.

The second part involves the networking aspect, the crux of our approach. We aimed to figure out who was friends with whom. For example, if you’re in a liberal or conservative bubble, you have a low ability to predict what’s going to happen outside of your bubble. So, we focused on people in more heterogeneous groups, where some friends are left-leaning, some are right-leaning, and some are centrist. This diversity increases the probability of making accurate predictions. The methodology involves playing with probabilities assigned to different individuals, and these probabilities have weights, which is how we determine the accuracy. So, not every person’s opinion matters in the same way. That’s the general idea.

Where would these surveys be accessible?

The crucial part is social media. Previously, during the elections, we did everything on Facebook. But this was before Cambridge Analytica when Facebook was very open to giving us the data we needed. We didn’t take any personal information besides what we asked for in the survey, like gender and age; we only gathered network data from Facebook. If your friends joined the survey with you, we could connect you. Now, we’re doing everything on Twitter and LinkedIn. We’re sourcing from those networks because Facebook no longer allows it following the Cambridge Analytica scandal. This is not a problem because people are typically on the same platforms. Again, we don’t need to know who these people are. All we know is who they’re connected with.

Would you have achieved the same results if you could go back and use Twitter and LinkedIn?

The data on Facebook was more versatile, and there was more of it. You could do more with a bigger pool. It wasn’t just the data itself but also the critical relationships between the data. Much of this was based on network theory in physics, akin to network science in general. My two partners, and later I, became remarkably proficient in this area. So, all we needed was good data to fit the theory and see if these things worked, and they did. With the Twitter data, I don’t think it would have been as helpful as the Facebook data, but once you learn what you need, you can apply it to any other platform that has a network.

How did you come up with the name Oraclum?

It’s a Latin word for prediction.

So, before starting the hedge fund, did you have any investing experience, and how did you learn about markets? What books did you read?

I’ve been investing on and off since 2011-2012. I began trading options in a retail capacity in 2018. Back then, trading options on Tesla was the name of the game, and I went through the whole trader experience. I love the Market Wizards book by Schwager because I went through the same processes as many of the people featured in it. You initially make a lot of money on something and think, “Oh my, this is easy, and I am so smart.” Then, you lose a lot of money on something else, and that’s when you start learning. So, I did have some experience with options. Since 2021, when I began testing Oraclum’s methodology, my options trading knowledge has improved significantly. We needed options because they provide convexity (i.e., non-linear payoffs), which is crucial when predicting with 60%-70% accuracy, which is what we achieved. So, while I did have some experience, it has grown exponentially over the past few years since I started the fund.

Graphic: Retrieved from Simplify Asset Management. “An investment strategy is convex if its payoff relative to its benchmark is curved upward.”

What did the fund structuring process look like, and what guided your decision to create a hedge fund versus an ETF, which would allow more people access?

The hedge fund versus the ETF is a matter of cost. Launching an ETF requires about $250,000 upfront, which is beyond our reach at the time. However, we aim to establish an ETF within the next few years to offer it to a broader audience. Many people who participate in our surveys are eager to invest, but with our current $100,000 cap, they can’t. The ETF would allow them to be investors, providing an even stronger incentive to participate and perform well in the surveys.

To answer your question further, we need to go back to 2016, around the time of Brexit and Trump’s election. That’s when we decided to start a company. We set up shop in the United Kingdom, specifically in Cambridge—no connection to Cambridge Analytica; we’re the good guys and don’t misuse data. Initially, we focused on market research projects on elections, market trends, and public sentiment. However, after correctly predicting the 2020 election outcome between Biden and Trump, we started attracting clients from the finance industry who were buying our election predictions. I thought, “Why not test this on the markets?”

We had some funds and could hire people to help us, so we began the project with the mindset of trying it out for a year or two. If it didn’t work, we could always return to market research. But the project quickly gained momentum. I invested about $20,000 of my own money, and over a year and a half, I grew it to $54,000. I did this transparently, posting screenshots of my trades in my newsletter. People could see my profits and losses weekly. I would even send survey participants the trades I planned to make, and this transparency resonated with them—some became investors.

Like many others, our biggest investor initially followed us on Twitter and subscribed to the newsletter. After nearly a year of testing, the final decision to start the hedge fund came around the summer of 2022. People following us said they wanted to invest more seriously, so we started the process. I remember discussing it with my wife and telling her, “You need the confidence of someone who knows nothing about something but does it anyway.” We launched the hedge fund in 2023 and learned as we went.

Before we started, I spoke with a lawyer and met with potential investors. I also surveyed newsletter subscribers to gauge interest and ask if they’d like to invest. We received around $10 million in commitments. Of course, there’s a difference between pledging money and investing it, so we only started with about $2 million when we launched the fund in February 2023.

Our hedge fund story differs from most. While others often launch with $100 million, $200 million, or even $1 billion, we’re bootstrapping our way up, starting small but with solid performance and growing trust from our investors. It’s an unconventional story, but we don’t need the typical team of analysts or a Bloomberg terminal. We have our method and trade in a very straightforward way.

What does it cost to run your type of operation?

In the first year, last year, the budget was about $100,000. It is more significant this year because I’m expanding the entire marketing scope. It’s projected to be around $400,000. However, with our profit, we’re comfortably funding the entire operation.

Was creating the fund structure cost-intensive as well? 

Surprisingly, no. It was about $30,000 altogether and set up in Delaware. I found good lawyers and used all the money I earned investing myself to fund it.

What does your investment process look like from pre- to post-trade?

It is straightforward. We get a signal every Wednesday before the market opens. Once we get the signal, we want to determine its strength. Then, we typically open positions about an hour after the opening, at about 10:30 Eastern on Wednesdays. We will keep the position until the end of trading on Fridays. This is the optimal timing for our prediction if we were right. We only allocate about 2% of our portfolio to each trade. If we’re wrong, the options expire worthless, and we lose 2% of the premium. If we’re right, then we make multiples of that. That is in a nutshell. Now, there are things that we can do. For example, we have this trailing stop strategy; if we make 1.5%, we will increase stops and keep raising them gradually. We have been testing and have considered using 0 DTE options in the other direction to hedge our profits.

Are these options spreads that you are buying? 

A vertical. We always buy spreads.

You would never try any complex or ratio-type structures, right?

No, we keep it simple. We used to, and the following is a great story about that.

The fund is performing well currently. However, right out of the gate in March of last year, we were down 15% on our first $2 million. At the start, we told our investors they would be out if we lost 20%, so it was a tricky situation.

What went wrong? Several things contributed. 

For background, I only risked 10% each week when trading alone. With about $20,000, this meant risking $2,000. A part of my strategy involved using iron condors, as our methodology works well in both direction and precision; our predictions are within 2% of the market’s actual ending about 80-85% of the time, which is quite significant. Thus, the iron condor structure worked well when trading on my own in 2021 and early 2022.

However, since the introduction of 0 DTE options, the price of the Friday options has changed dramatically, and the risk-reward ratio has shifted from 2:1 to 8:1; now, I would risk $800 to make the same $100. If I lost $800, I would need eight good weeks to compensate for one bad week. Consequently, iron condors are no longer viable. This structure, we know, significantly hurt us in the first quarter of 2023, which is why we abandoned it, along with others, focusing solely on directional options and spreads.

Graphic: Retrieved from Oraclum Capital.

My first thought was how much of that was the volatility environment. So you dropped the condors, and then, did you change how you traded the verticals?

When we started the fund, we risked about 5%. When things quickly got out of hand, we lowered it; when we were down 15%, we reduced it to 1%, and it took us about five months to break even, gradually increasing our exposure. Now, we’ve found that 2% to 3%, depending on the strength of the signal, is our optimal point. So yes, it affected our position sizing. Regarding volatility in March of last year, the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank also impacted us.

Graphic: Retrieved from Federal Reserve. Due to the rapid pace of interest rate increases, Silicon Valley Bank’s unhedged bond portfolio significantly lost value, contributing to difficulties meeting withdrawal demands.

Would you consider trades like the iron condor again if the volatility environment changed?

It works for us over 80% of the time, but the risk-reward ratio is no longer suitable. That’s why we don’t want to engage again. The current data shows flat or slightly above-flat results, so there’s no point in doing it.

Do changes in volatility and positioning affect how you trade the underlying market? So, at the beginning of August, we had a bunch of volatility. You probably weren’t in positions at the start of the week because it was a Monday, and you avoided that. But do those significant changes in volatility impact how you structure trades?

Not the structure. 

Let’s go back to that week. On Monday, markets were down. We were mostly in bonds and cash. We ended the week up 1%, with the compression of volatility benefitting us; as volatility went down and markets went up, it was an easy trade for us in retrospect.

It would have been fantastic if we had held puts on that Monday. If we had held calls, we would have only lost the premiums. That’s why volatility doesn’t impact us negatively, no matter how big. This is because we’re not sellers of options. If we were sellers, that would be a different problem. However, since we buy options, the most we can lose is the premium. We know our risk—if we’re wrong in a week like that, we lose 2% and move on to the following week.

Also, I noticed a mismatch between bid and ask prices on that particular day. That is something to consider as well. But if I had put options and there was a huge mismatch, we would have worked them at the mid-price.

Graphic: Retrieved from Reuters.

How are you executing these orders? Are these just market orders, or are you setting a limit?

Always limit orders.

Are you using one of the ETFs, or do you use cash-settled indexes like the SPX?

ETF. Not the cash.

Would going into something like the SPX be more cost-efficient if you grow large enough?

Yes, absolutely. Right now, one of our institutional investors is coming in, and they want us to employ the same strategy using options on futures like the E-mini S&P 500 (FUTURE: /ES). Looking at the data, the approach also works there.

Are you testing trades in real time or backtesting?

Backtest.

If you were to go live with either the /ES or SPX, would you do that with a smaller size initially, test it out, and see how it works on that scale? 

Yes. Initially, use a smaller size and then push it up as we go along.

Right now, we’re small—a $17 million fund—so I trade a couple hundred thousand dollars worth of premium every week, which is not a lot. Once bigger, we can look to the SPX and /ES, where the liquidity pools keep increasing. 

As we grow in size, it’s straightforward for us to scale.

You said you risked 2%. Is the other 98% still in Treasury Bills?

90% in T-Bills, and 8% is a cash buffer.

Graphic: Retrieved from Exotic Options and Hybrids.

Because you’re always out of these spreads at the end of the week, I assume you’re pretty liquid and can quickly meet redemptions. 

Yes, that’s not a problem for us.

If interest rates fell or you had a significant lull, would that change how you invest that capital?

It probably would. Right now, we’re taking advantage of the carry. There’s a straightforward carry trade—you leave cash in bonds for a year and get ~4%. It will probably be a different instrument if we return to the pre-COVID interest rate environment or even post-COVID 2021. However, I would still want to keep most of it in bonds because of the safety. Think of it like Taleb’s “Barbell Strategy.” You have 90% in something very safe and 10% in something very volatile—in our case, 2%.

You’re not using box spreads, right? You’re actually in T-Bills, right?

We have T-Bills but will switch to box spreads because of the tax implications.

Graphic: Retrieved from the OCC.

How do you monitor the strength of the signals, and do you scale back if that signal weakens?

This is an ongoing process, and there are several things we’re looking at. Regarding the signal strength, we have KPIs. We’re monitoring whether the signal is improving or worsening over the past 4 or 5 weeks. If it falls below our crucial indicator, we say, “Okay, let’s see what the problem is, what’s happening, and how we can fix it?” Signal weakening can be due to several reasons, such as a drop in our survey response rates during slower periods of the year. If we can detect issues, we can prevent them from escalating. We allow ourselves a maximum of one lousy month.

Can you explain your fee structure?

We have a 1.5% management fee and a 25% performance fee subject to an 8% hurdle, accounted for quarterly. We must clear 2% each quarter before applying the 25% performance fee. There’s also a high-water mark in place. Performance fees can only be charged if the fund consistently makes money. So, if the fund makes money in one quarter but loses money in the next, it can only charge a performance fee once it has recovered the losses in the subsequent quarter and exceeded the previous high-water mark; the performance fee can only be applied to any additional profits after surpassing the previous peak value.

Despite being systematic, you’re still executing these by hand, inputting orders, setting limits, and so on, right? How do you manage any biases and emotions and just execute?

I have a psychology coach guiding me through this process, which is necessary. I’ve experienced losses before starting the fund, but managing other people’s money is different—it comes with much higher responsibility. Plus, you must report to these people regularly and inform them about any losses. This was particularly challenging for us in March of 2023 when we had just started the fund and were down 15%. We thought, “What do we do now, and how do we face these people again?” I did a lot of exercises to help myself cope with the situation, and I realized that the solution lies in sticking to the process. The less I meddle, the better our investment returns are; we achieve better outcomes by completely removing our biases and following the process, one of our key performance indicators. Ultimately, I aim to expand the team, hire traders, and stop trading myself. Although I could automate the entire process, it doesn’t always work as intended; sometimes, the machine won’t perform exactly as you want. That’s why I believe human traders still have value. We’re not high-frequency traders, so we don’t need machines to execute nanosecond trades. Instead, we rely on humans following a system to execute the orders.

Do you ever have a signal and you’re putting on a trade but think, “This isn’t going to work,” but you still go through with it because you are following a system?

Yes, but I’ve taught myself not to deviate. Sure, maybe this week I’m going to help it, but the next week I’m probably going to destroy it. Again, it is the whole psychological mindset thing. I still get the urge, but you’re pushing yourself to make this emotionless. It is a process, so it’s going to take a while.

So, the hedge fund feels like your second act to me. Do you have a third in mind, and may that involve you working in the government, especially given the research you’ve done?

I’m so removed from governments that it’s liberating. 

The three of us at Oraclum—Vinković, Šikić, and myself—are political junkies. Since starting the fund, I’ve asked myself why I even cared. At this point, it’s tough for me to think about a third act, especially now that we’re in the middle of building this. 

It depends on how much money I earn—maybe philanthropy or something else. We’ll see.

Have you done any work for the next set of U.S. elections? If so, can you share any results?

This is the big argument that my two co-founders and I have. One of them is against us doing this because of the focus of the fund, our investors, and everything else. And that makes sense. We won’t do it, even though I see it as a great marketing tool.

If you were to predict the next set of elections, what would you do differently?

I streamline much more toward the key swing states. 

Pennsylvania was the key state in the last two U.S. elections, 2020 and 2016. As soon as we saw in our survey that Trump was winning Pennsylvania in 2016, that was it; Trump was taking the election. The same happened in 2020. At no point did Biden ever lose Pennsylvania in our surveys. So that was the turning point for us. Ohio and Florida were going for Trump. Before this election, whoever won Ohio and Florida would become the U.S. president. Not this time because you had Pennsylvania and Michigan going in the other direction. So, if I were doing it this year, I would focus on a handful of swing states. You can follow the surveys for the rest, focusing on Pennsylvania and Michigan. Ohio and Florida will most likely go to Trump. But then, I would also look at Arizona, North Carolina, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

I recently watched a podcast featuring Citadel’s Ken Griffin. In it, he emphasized the importance of studying your winners rather than getting too hung up on the losers. Does your experience validate this thinking?

That’s a good point. I get more excited about the winners and learn that the losers don’t matter—move on. 

There’s this great quote by Roger Federer: “In tennis, perfection is impossible. In the 1526 matches I played, I won almost 80% of them. But I only won 54% of the points in those matches.” For him, it’s not about the points. When they’re gone, they’re gone. You move on to the next one. It’s the same thing here. For every week we lose 2%, we move on. But when we get a big win, we’re delighted. It’s a psychological thing as well. You can get much more if you don’t cut the profits too soon and keep a trailing loss. That’s why we have weeks where we’ve made 5% or 6% in a week, which is good. So there is something to it. 

We study the winners because it can all come down to 5 or 6 weeks a year when we make the bulk of the return on the fund. Everything else cancels out; the small winners and losers cancel each other out.

Graphic: YouTube interview with Citadel’s Kenneth Griffin.

Do you have any mentors or people you look up to? 

I love that Market Wizards book by Schwager. Every interview in it is very revealing and comforting. When I was younger, I idolized George Soros. What we do has nothing to do with how Soros trades; he’s a big ideas guy, and I could never compete. It’s the same thing with people like Ray Dalio. It’s a different way of competing. 

I want to emulate someone like Paul Tudor Jones.

Do you have a favorite book recommendation?

Nassim Nicholas Taleb opened my eyes to options trading. After I read his third book, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder, I thought, “Options are interesting; let’s see how this works.” I also think psychology books are great. So, Trading in the Zone: Master the Market with Confidence, Discipline, and a Winning Attitude and Schwager’s Market Wizards are fantastic because traders often make the same stupid mistakes; everyone goes through the same process.


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